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Business as Usual: the dynamics of
government-business relations in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region
JAMES T. H. TANG*
This is an attempt to evaluate the implications of Hong Kong's political transition to
post-colonial rule for economic governance in the SAR beyond the 'Beijing versus Hong
Kong' perspective. The article examines the changing government-business dynamics in
Hong Kong after the reversion by focusing on three inter-related dimensions: economic
ideology; institutional and policy framework; and the new political environment in
post-colonial Hong Kong. By challenging the assertion that Hong Kong is returning to the
pre-Patten colonial order under Chinese management, it argues that economic governance
in Hong Kong has always been more complex than has been characterized in the literature.
A conceptual framework incorporating the dynamic interplay of domestic and international
factors is needed to comprehend the changing nature of government-business relationships
in the SAR.
Introduction
The first Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government under
Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa is seen to be a pro-business administration. Tung,
a former businessman, won the leadership selection with the support of prominent
local business leaders. His appointment has given rise to the suggestion that
Beijing's promise of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' (gangren zhigang)
would transpire to be 'business people ruling Hong Kong' (shangren zhigang).
Moreover, the rationale for Hong Kong's existence as a SAR and the privileges
granted to the territory in maintaining a high degree of autonomy following the
reversion is based primarily on economic consideration. Although the 'one country;
two systems' formula is also used by the mainland government as a solution to
* James T. H. Tang is Associate Professor and Head, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University
of Hong Kong. His recent publications include: 'The Special Administrative Region Government and the changing
political order', in Norman Miners, ed., with post-handover update by James Tang, The Government and Politics of
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Hong Kong's Reunion with China: The Global,
co-edited with G.A. Postiglione (New York and Hong Kong: M.E. Sharpe and Hong Kong University Press, 1997).
This article is partly developed from a paper written for a United Nations University project co-directed by Inoguchi
Takashi and Jean Blondel on economic change and democracy in East and Southeast Asia. I am grateful to other project
members, especially Ian Marsh, for their suggestions. I would also like to thank participants of the joint Journal of
Contemporary China/University of Hong Kong workshop, in particular C. K. Lau, for their comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
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bring reunification with Taiwan, Beijing would obviously like to see an economi-
cally thriving Hong Kong dominated by business interests rather than a politically
active Hong Kong dominated by popularly elected democrats and grass-roots
leaders.
Tung himself has repeatedly asserted that Hong Kong had become too politicized
during the past decade or so of political transition since the signing of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's future in 1984. He would, pre-
sumably, prefer the return of the old political order which was characterized by
'administrative absorption of polities' with the top echelon of government working
closely with the business elite under the economic philosophy of lassez faire or a
form of 'positive non-interventionism'. The government's minimalist approach in
economic management is seen as a defining feature of the Hong Kong system,
which the Chinese government has committed to preserve.
Prior to China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in July 1997, the
territory had won the title as the world's freest economy for three times in a row
in the Heritage Foundation's index of economic freedom. This assessment was well
supported by the local business community. The government's role in business was
ranked as the most appropriate by local business leaders according to a poll in May
1997 conducted in 10 economies in the Asia-Pacific region. In response to the
question: how much influence does the government wield over business in your
country, 80% of the respondents in Hong Kong said it was just enough, 10% stated
that it was too much, and 5% said too little, and 5% said there was no influence
at all. In Australia and Thailand, ranked second and third respectively in the poll,
38.5 and 46.3% of the respondents believed that their governments had too much
influence over business. In Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indone-
sia, Japan and South Korea, half or more felt that their governments had too much
influence.1
The incorporation of a free wheeling capitalist city by a large socialist country
without changes is so unimaginable that many observers were not convinced that
such an arrangement would work. In 1995, Fortune magazine even announced the
death of Hong Kong as an international city.2 Some also predicted cronyism and
favouritism for those politically loyal to the central government and expected that
labour organizations would become agents of the state rather than representing
labour interests.3 In the end, Hong Kong's reversion to China proved to be
remarkably smooth. The British government was able to state in its first post-han-
dover evaluation that: 'There has been no evidence of the Chinese Government
trying to restrict the HKSAR's high degree of autonomy or to impose its own
officials on the HKSAR Government. We saw no sign of Chinese involvement in
the formulation of C. H. Tung's first annual policy address as Chief Executive,
delivered in October. Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed their commitment to
the Joint Declaration and the HKSAR's autonomy'.4
1. Asian Executive Poll, Far Eastern Economic Review, (29 May 1997).
2. Louis Kraar, 'The death of Hong Kong', Fortune 131(12), (26 June 1995), pp. 44-52.
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman and Alvin Rabushka, Red Flag Over Hong Kong (Chatham, N.J.:
Chatham House, 1996), pp. 114-117.
4. Sino-British Joint Declaration Six-monthly Report to Parliament, July-December 1997 (London: Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, 1998).
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Hong Kong's liberal economic system has also continued to operate. In Heritage
Foundation's first full year assessment of the Hong Kong SAR, the Foundation
reported: 'There continues to be little government interference in the marketplace;
taxes remain low and predictable; increases in government spending are linked
closely with economic growth; foreign trade is still free; and regulations, in
addition to being transparent, continue to be applied both uniformly and consist-
ently'.5 In December 1998, the World Trade Organization's first trade policy
review of post-colonial Hong Kong concluded that the economic regime of the
SAR had remained open.6
Contrary to most predictions, the most serious challenge for post-colonial Hong
Kong was economic rather than political. The SAR plunged into an economic
recession following the financial turmoil that swept through the East Asian region
in the second half of 1997. With a slump in tourism, a drastic fall in retail trade,
the stock and property markets collapsed and Hong Kong entered into recession.
Less than 2 months after the first anniversary of the reversion the minimalist Hong
Kong government launched a massive intervention in the financial markets at the
end of August 1998. The Hong Kong government spent over US$ 15 billion to
acquire shares in the Hong Kong stock market to 'maintain the stability of the
financial market against foreign speculators'.7 Although the government has in-
sisted that it was not a departure from the much cherished policy of 'positive
non-interventionism', the magnitude and scale of the intervention was clearly
unprecedented.
The SAR government defended its position as an attempt to fend off speculators
who were accused of manipulating the Hong Kong currency through a double play
strategy. The 'speculators', reportedly, attacked the Hong Kong currency (pegged
at a fixed exchange rate of US$ 1.00 to HK$ 7.80) by massive selling of the Hong
Kong dollar. They apparently attempted to reap huge profits by building up large
short positions in the stock index futures, in anticipation of a fall in share prices
when the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) had to raise interest rates to
defend the attack against the peg.8 None the less, the intervention was widely seen
to have violated free market principles. Although the Heritage Foundation still
awarded Hong Kong the number one position as the freest economy in the world
at the end of 1998, it warned that, 'we hope that Hong Kong's government will
reverse this action and return to the free-market practices that made its economy so
strong in the past—or its ranking surely will fall in next year's edition of the
Index'.9
5. Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, The 1999 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington
DC: Heritage Foundation, 1998).
6. Trade Policy Review: Hong Kong, China (Geneva: World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Body,
December 1998).
7. The amount spent (HK$ 118 billion) on 26 October 1998 was disclosed following the first board meeting of
the Exchange Fund Investment Limited. The company was set up by the government to manage the government's
share holdings independently and on a level-playing field with other market players.
8. See for example a letter by Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Financial
Times, (17 August 1998).
9. Preface in Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, The 1999 Index of Economic Freedom
(Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 1998).
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The government's action not only tarnished Hong Kong's reputation as the freest
economy in the world and generated intense debates about the government's
motivation, but also raised two other important questions. The first concerns the
competence of the administration in managing the economic crisis. The second,
which is the focus of this article, concerns the model of economic governance in
Hong Kong. The discourse on the government's role in economic management
cannot be meaningful without reference to the political context. Although the local
business community has been supportive of the government's action, and the share
prices of major local companies bounced back following the government's buyout,
many prominent local businessmen complain that the business environment in
Hong Kong has deteriorated because the SAR has become too politicized. The
Director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce went as far as to state
that Hong Kong was moving away from capitalism to socialism not because of
pressure from Beijing, but because of internal political pressure for more welfare
and labour rights.10
Chief Executive Tung has insisted that things have remained unchanged in the
SAR after the reversion, but his views about the politicization of Hong Kong echo
those raised by prominent figures in the business community. It is clear that the old
colonial model of economic governance characterized by close government-
business relationships is under stress and that the departure of the British does not
simply represent the replacement of one group of business elite by another. This
article is an attempt to evaluate the implications of Hong Kong's political transition
to post-colonial rule for economic governance in the SAR beyond the 'Beijing
versus Hong Kong' perspective. The article examines the changing government-
business dynamics in Hong Kong after the reversion by concentrating on three
inter-related dimensions: economic ideology, institutional and policy framework,
and the new political environment in post-colonial Hong Kong. By challenging the
assertion that Hong Kong is returning to the pre-Patten colonial order under
Chinese management, it argues that economic governance in Hong Kong has
always been more complex than has been characterized in the literature.
A conceptual framework incorporating the dynamic interplay of domestic and
international factors is needed to comprehend the changing nature of the
government-business relationship in the SAR.
Economic ideology
Hong Kong's minimalist approach to economic governance, which comes from the
19th century British tradition of allowing free play to market forces, has guided the
government's economic policies ever since the establishment of colonial Hong
Kong. In the classic model of a free economy, as Milton Friedman explained,
10. Businessman Ronnie Chan Chi-chung suggested that the business community has become less influential
because of the growing concentration of power in the hands of political parties and interest groups, see South China
Morning Post, (12 December 1998). One of Hong Kong's most famous businessman, Li Ka-shing, declared that he
intended to pull out of a HK$ 10 billion project because he was not pleased with the political environment in Hong
Kong, where some members of a political party attacked him for suing buyers who had defaulted on flat purchases
developed by his company, see South China Morning Post, (23 December 1998). Remarks by Eden Woon Yi-teng
of the General Chamber of Commerce were reported in South China Morning Post, (24 December 1998).
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economic activity is organized primarily on 'voluntary exchange through the
market'. Writing at the end of the 1970s, Friedman described Hong Kong as
the best contemporaneous example of such a society."
The champion of free market has this to say about the role of the government
in Hong Kong: 'It has no government direction of economic activity, no minimum
wage laws, no fixing of prices. The residents are free to buy from whom they want,
to sell to whom they want, to invest however they want, to hire whom they
want, to work for whom they want'. The role of the Hong Kong government,
according to Friedman, is limited to: law and order enforcement, providing a means
for formulating the rules of conduct, adjudicating disputes, facilitating transporta-
tion and communication, and supervising the issuance of currency. He suggested
that: 'Although government spending has grown as the economy has grown, it
remains among the lowest in the world as a fraction of the income of the people.
As a result, low taxes preserve incentives. Businessmen can reap the benefits of
their success but must also bear the costs of their mistakes'.12
What Friedman and some other free market advocates did not address was that
although colonial Hong Kong was a minimalist state in the management of its
economy, it was a strong state in terms of its institutional capacity and political
dominance. Formal political powers were concentrated in the hands of the Gover-
nor and the administration ruled in coalition with the major business corporations
with the support of prominent local Chinese.13 Whilst economic development had
generated a strong political demand for democracy in some other East Asian states,
the Hong Kong state was not challenged politically until the Sino-British talks on
the future of the territory began in the early 1980s. When political turbulence swept
through neighbouring countries during the era of independence in the 1950s and
1960s, Hong Kong stayed politically stable under colonial rule. Politically, liberal-
ization in Taiwan and South Korea during the early and mid-1980s did not
stimulate strong political demands in colonial Hong Kong either. Contrary to works
which suggested that pro-market developments would facilitate the growth of
democracies, economically liberal Hong Kong remained undemocratic under
British rule.14
The political arrangements for Hong Kong's reversion to China, negotiated
between the Chinese and British governments during the mid-1980s, were designed
to maintain the old colonial model of economic governance. Under this model the
administration worked closely with the business community to maintain a free and
stable economic environment through which Hong Kong managed to prosper in the
past. Some scholars have described Hong Kong as a colonial welfare state because
of its massive public housing programme, providing a comprehensive system of
public education, public health, and subsidized public transport and social services.
11. Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (Hamonsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1980),
pp. 47-54.
12. Ibid., p. 55.
13. A comprehensive account of how Hong Kong was governed is given in: Norman Miners, Government and
Politics of Hong Kong (5th edition with post-handover update by James T. H. Tang) (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1998).
14. A comparative study of the different paths of economic and political development in East Asia is Anek
Laothamatas, ed., Democracy in Southeast and East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997).
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But even the revisionist interpretation acknowledges that the colonial state's
involvement in economic affairs was far more subtle and indirect compared with
other East Asian economies.15 Indeed, few would question that the Hong Kong
government genuinely believed in a free and open economy, even if its policies had
not always been consistent with that economic philosophy.
The colonial administration's last annual report stated that, 'the government
advocates free and fair competition. Business decisions are left to the private sector,
except where social considerations are over-riding. It is considered that the
allocation of resources in the economy is best left to market forces. Adopting this
free-market philosophy, the government has not sought to influence the structure of
industry through regulations, tax policies or subsidies'. The government also kept
a low tax regime and contained the growth rate of public sector expenditure.16 A
recent analysis of the strength of the Hong Kong economy made the following
observation: 'The clear separation in Hong Kong between the role of the govern-
ment as referee, and the role of private companies as active players in the economy,
is unique in Asia and rare world-wide'.17
At the time of the political handover in July 1997, the arguments that Hong
Kong's economy would continue to prosper under the old colonial model of
economic governance were very powerful. Although the Chinese economic system
is officially socialist, socialism with Chinese characteristics clearly embraces
principles of a free market economy. The new administration's more pro-
business outlook as well as Beijing's economic interests in Hong Kong should also
ensure that the political transition would not bring economic disruption. The Hong
Kong economy remained robust, the economic fundamentals were strong. The
ideology for a free market economy would continue to guide an executive-led and
SAR government more interested in the creation of wealth than in democracy. The
major concern seemed to be arising from the growing presence of mainland
enterprises in the SAR and whether the administration could maintain the integrity
of its legal system without special privileges for Chinese enterprises in the
territory.18
The constitutional arrangements for the Hong Kong SAR, as promised by the
Joint Declaration, and confirmed by the Basic Law are meant to ensure
the continuation of the existing systems in Hong Kong. The Basic Law stipulated:
'The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong SAR,
and the previous capitalist system way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years'
(Article 5).
15. Manuel Castels argued that the level of intervention in Hong Kong is as significant as in other East Asian states,
and described it as a colonial welfare state, but he conceded that the Hong Kong state's involvement was more subtle
and indirect. See his 'Four Asian tigers with a dragon head: a comparative analysis of the state, economy, and society
in the Asian Pacific rim', in Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson, eds, States and Development in the Asia
Pacific Rim (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), pp. 45-49.
16. Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: Information Services Department, 1997), p. 64.
17. Michael J. Enright, Edith E. Scott and David Dodwell, The Hong Kong Advantage (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1997), p. 30.
18. See for example, Yasheng Huang, 'The economic and political integration of Hong Kong: implications for
government-business relations', in Warren I. Cohen and Li Zhao, eds, Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: The Economic
and Political Implications of Reversion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 96-113.
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The legal framework of economic governance as provided for under the Basic
Law included the following elements: independence, preservation of the present
economic and legal framework, and development of appropriate policies to main-
tain the current financial system which is both liberal and highly open, with
maintenance of the existing international network. They are stipulated by various
articles in the Basic Law:
• The Hong Kong SAR shall have independent finances. It shall use its own
financial revenues without contributing to the central government. The central
government also cannot levy taxes in the SAR (Article 106).
• The SAR shall practise an independent taxation system and continue to pursue
the low tax policy (Article 108).
• The Hong Kong SAR should provide an appropriate economic and legal
environment for maintaining Hong Kong's status as a financial centre (Article
109).
• The Hong Kong SAR shall formulate its own monetary and financial policies,
safeguard the free operation of financial business and markets with proper
regulations (Article 110).
• The Hong Kong SAR shall ensure that currency shall continue to be freely
convertible with no foreign exchange control, and the free flow of capital in and
out of the territory (Article 112).
• The Hong Kong SAR shall maintain its status as a free port and remain as a
separate custom territory, and pursue a policy of free trade (Articles 114, 115 and
116).
In a study of the legal order of the SAR, one of Hong Kong's most prominent
public law experts suggested that 'the intention in the Basic Law was to entrench
the existing capitalist system'.19 The reference to previous/existing practices and
policies suggests that the SAR government would have to operate within the
economic framework prior to the time when the Joint Declaration was signed
between the two sovereign governments. While the legal framework as stipulated
by the Basic Law has guaranteed the independence and liberal orientation of the
economic system in Hong Kong, the SAR would still be able to pursue such broad
objectives using different instruments and with varying degrees of involvement in
its macro-economic management.
After the political handover, the administration maintained its commitment to
carry-on the lassez faire tradition. In fact there was little to worry about on the
economic front. The SAR inherited a very strong economy. In 1997 Hong Kong
was the world's 5th largest banking centre for external financial transactions; the
5th largest foreign exchange market; the 7th largest stock market; the 7th largest
trader; and the busiest container port. It was ranked as the second most competitive
economy in the world in 1997 (after Singapore) by the World Economic Forum and
reclassified as an advanced economy by the International Monetary Fund. In the
words of Donald Tsang, the first Financial Secretary of the SAR, 'Hong Kong is
19. Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic
Law (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1997), p. 152.
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already the best place in the world in which to do business. The Government
is totally committed to ensuring that it remains so'.20
A product of joint Sino-British consultation, Hong Kong's 1997-98 budget
confirmed that the Beijing government had no intention of making Hong Kong
socialist. The commitment to Hong Kong's role as an international business and
financial centre with a guarantee of financial prudence was demonstrated by the
administration's decision not to increase business and profit taxes. In 1998, when
the Financial Secretary announced tax cuts and increased benefits for the public in
the first budget that was prepared wholly for the SAR, he also maintained that the
SAR government remained small and efficient, with total public expenditure kept
below 20% of GDP.21
The financial turmoil which hit the Asian region in 1997 eventually also brought
economic difficulties to Hong Kong. Outlining some of the economic problems that
Hong Kong could have to weather in 1998 and 1999, the Financial Secretary still
remained optimistic about the SAR's economic situation in early 1998. Acknowl-
edging the economic pain for the SAR as a result of a sharp decline in stock market
value and the property market, he remained positive about the economic outlook.
While the government recognized that the financial turmoil would damage the
territory's trade, and warned of the likely rise in unemployment, the Financial
Secretary forecast a modest yet positive GDP growth of 3.5% for 1998. He also
predicted a solid 4.8% growth in the export of goods and a 3.5% growth of exports
in services as well as an inflation rate at around 5%.22 In choosing 'Riding out the
storm: renewing Hong Kong strengths' as the title of his speech, the Financial
Secretary maintained that he was guided by two principles: assurance of continuity
matched with incentive for new growth. The Chief Executive affirmed that, 'we
practise sound macro-economic policy of small government, with strong support
for the free market'.23 This seemed consistent with the economic policy of previous
administrations. In short, the new SAR government indicated that it would continue
with a pro-business and lassez faire economic policy, i.e. 'business as usual'.
The economic downturn, however, proved to be far more severe than the SAR
government had anticipated when in May the government revised its estimate that
GDP could fall by 2% in real terms in the first quarter of 1998.24 The government's
response to the intensification of the economic problems in mid-1998—spending
massive public funds in financial markets, introducing new regulatory measures and
tightening discipline in the market—put a question mark to the government's
commitment to a liberal economic ideology. Defending the government's August
intervention, Joseph Yam, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
20. Donald Tsang, The 1997-98 Budget: Continuity in a Time of Change, 12 March 1997 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Government, 1997).
21. Ibid.; Donald Tsang, The 1998-99 Budget, Riding Out the Storm: Renewing Hong Kong Strengths, 18 February
1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 1998).
22. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
23. Speech by the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, at a lunch hosted by the Hong Kong Trade Development
Council and the Conseil National du Patronat Francais International (French Employers' Association), in Paris,
Wednesday, 11 March 1998.
24. Full details of the economic situation in early 1998 can be found in the government's First Quarter Economic
Report 1998 (Hong Kong: HKSAR government, May 1998).
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maintained that the government had not changed its approach to economic
governance in Hong Kong. Referring to remarks made by Sir Philip Haddon-Cave,
a former Financial Secretary who coined the term "positive non-interventionism",
Yam argued that the government had always intervened in the economy when there
were imperfections in the market.25 Sir Philip clearly believed that the administra-
tion did have a role in the management of Hong Kong's economy, but his view was
that the government would provide the basic legal framework and infrastructure to
facilitate the operation of market forces.26 While the Hong Kong government may
have responded to a crisis using extraordinary measures, Yam's argument that the
intervention was consistent with Hong Kong's free market principle is clearly
debatable.
While the government has continued to declare its commitment to a hands-off
approach to economic governance, the degree of governmental intervention in the
Hong Kong economy has deepened since the 1970s. With the growing sophistica-
tion of the Hong Kong economy, rising protectionism and the intensification of
competition from neighbouring countries, the liberal economic ideology of the
administration has been eroded over the past two decades.27 It has been argued that
the notion of 'positive non-intervention' marked the transformation of Hong Kong
from an administrative state to a provider state in response to both challenges to the
legitimacy of the colonial regime and an expansion of public services and more
active approach to physical and human capital investment. By the late 1980s and
early 1990s both government functions and services had expanded. The administra-
tion also stepped up regulatory actions and provided more support to local
industries and widened the scope of participation in the political process. In 1995
the Financial Secretary Hamish Macleod signified the government's new thinking
with the term 'consensus capitalism' in his budget speech.28 Reflecting growing
pressure on the government to assume a more active role in regulating economic
activities and supporting local businesses, the Hong Kong 1997 yearbook pro-
claimed that the government's policy was 'minimum interference and maximum
support'.29
In his first policy speech as Chief Executive of the SAR, Tung suggested that
under his leadership Hong Kong's development strategy would be based on free
market economy and a prudential fiscal policy. But he obviously considered that a
new and more coherent economic strategy would be required to push Hong Kong
forward. He set up a Commission on Strategy Development to 'conduct reviews
and studies on our economy, human resources, education, housing, land supply,
environmental protection, and relations with the Mainland, to ensure that our
25. Joseph Yam, 'Intervention true to guiding policy', South Ch ina Morning Post, (24 August 1998).
26. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 5th edition,
1991), p. 47.
27. For an analysis of the impact of protectionism on the world trading system see: Jagdish Bhagwati, The World
Trading System at Risk (Princeton: Princeton University, 1991); a useful survey of economic developments in East
Asia is given in Iyanatul Islam and Anis Chowdhury, Asia-Pacific Economies: A Survey (London: Routledge 1997).
28. For a brief discussion of the Hong Kong government's changing role see Anthony Cheung, "Why there is more
government intervention after the change of sovereignty?', Policy Bulletin of the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute,
No. 6, (July 1998).
29. Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: Information Services Department, 1997), p. 64.
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resources are well used, and that we keep up with the world trends in competitive
terms, and that we maintain the vitality of Hong Kong's economic development'.30
Tung further outlined his new vision for Hong Kong's economic development in
1998. In his second policy speech, the Chief Executive targeted industries which
placed importance on technology and multi-media applications as priority indus-
tries in the government's economic strategy. Endorsing recommendations by the
Commission on Innovation and Technology, he identified seven areas in which
Hong Kong would like to position itself: as a leading city for the development and
application of information technology; a world class design and fashion centre; a
regional centre for multi-media-based information and entertainment services; a
world centre for health food and Chinese medicine; a leading international centre
for supplying high value-added products; a regional centre for supplying pro-
fessional technological talents and services; and the market place for technology
transfer between the Mainland and the world. In order to realize the goals, the
government set up an Innovation and Technology Fund with an initial amount of
HK$ 5 billion to support 'mid-stream research'.31
Thus while the Tung administration preaches the fundamental beliefs of the
economic ideology of the old colonial model, he obviously also wants to adopt a
more pro-active approach in developing specific economic strategies for Hong
Kong. If the SAR government is still committed to maintaining the openness of the
economy, the erosion of the government's commitment to a liberal economic
ideology has continued even more rapidly since the reversion.
Institutional and policy framework
One major theme in the study of government-business relationships has been the
concept of state-strength. Many works on major industrializing Northeast Asian
economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have emphasized the existence of
effective states with a well-developed bureaucracy capable of formulating econ-
omic policy without being captive to rent-seeking societal groups. While the
political elite did form alliances with business interests, their relationship was
highly unequal with the state acting as the dominant partner. Most of these states
have been described as 'strong states' which were willing to coerce the business
groups to move towards economic objectives formulated by the state.32 The Hong
Kong state, widely seen as a minimal state, has not been regarded as a dominant
partner in its infamous alliance with the business community.33
30. Building Hong Kong for a New Era, Address by the Chief Executive the honorurable Tung Chee Hwa at the
Provisional Legislative Council meeting on 8 October 1997 (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, 1997), paragraph 16.
31. From Adversity to Opportunity, Address by the Chief Executive The Honourable Tung Chee Hwa at the
Legislative Council meeting on 7 October 1998 (Hong Kong: HKSAR government, 1998).
32. See discussions in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994), pp. 3-4. The standard work on the subject is: Frederic Deyo, The Political Economy of The
New Asian Industralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). See also Yu-han Chu, 'State structure and economic
adjustment of the East Asian newly industrializing countries', International Organization 43(4); Stephan Haggard,
Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrailizing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990).
33. Norman Miners, Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 46.
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In fact the business elite had been very much an integral part of the system of
governance in colonial Hong Kong. Business representatives were invited to serve
the colonial government by an administration headed by a governor appointed by
London from the ranks of the colonial service and, after the demise of the Colonial
Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Chris Patten being the only
exception). Local business elite exercised influences over government through
representation in the territory's highest advisory body—the Executive Council, and
its law-making body—the Legislative Council. Until the late 1980s members of
both councils, dominated by top-ranking bureaucrats and representatives of major
business interests, were all appointed by the government. The colonial administra-
tion also set up a consultative system in the form of committees to advise the
government on matters related to the economy. While state-business relationships
in colonial Hong Kong were far more delicate and complex than the East Asian
economic model in which the state is always firmly in the driver's seat, the
administrative state of Hong Kong also adopted corporatist strategies in maintain-
ing its political position. Moreover, colonial Hong Kong was served by a
well-developed and highly efficient bureaucracy and successfully went through its
industrialization stage during the 1960s and 1970s.
The Hong Kong 'state', however, could hardly be considered as a 'weak state'
in terms of its autonomy against society and its terms of its organizational capacity
and its effectiveness in implementing policies. It has been described as such
because it has kept government involvement in the economy to a minimum in the
past. The weakness of the Hong Kong state was therefore the result of a policy
choice guided by a liberal economic ideology and other political considerations. In
terms of resource and capacity the bureaucratic machinery of Hong Kong is by no
means weak.34 Hong Kong's well established economic philosophy of 'positive
non-interventionism', was therefore an outcome of not simply a pro-business
agenda, but also a deliberate choice by a colonial administration whose raison
d'etre was almost completely commercial.
The Chief Executive of the SAR took over a powerful bureaucratic machinery
when he assumed office on 1 July. Political power was always concentrated in the
hands of the governor under colonial rule. The governors were advised by
the Executive Council and implemented government policies through the
policy branches, which were in turn supported by government departments
and agencies. A parallel network of statutory bodies, many directly answerable
to the governors, also existed to support or implement government policies
when direct governmental control was regarded as inappropriate. When the
SAR government came into existence in 1997 there were 15 policy and resources
bureaux,35 71 government departments and agencies plus a number of statutory
34. See section on different state characteristics in the discussions of government-business collaboration by Ben
Ross Schneider and Sylvia Maxfield, 'Business, the state, and economic performance in developing countries', in
Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds, Business and The State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997), p. 21.
35. Broadcasting, Culture and Sport Bureau; Civil Service Bureau; Constitutional Affairs Bureau; Economic
Services Bureau; Education and Manpower Bureau; Finance Bureau; Financial Services Bureau; Health and Welfare
Bureau; Home Affairs Bureau; Housing Bureau; Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau; Security Bureau; Trade
and Industry Bureau; Transport Bureau; and Works Bureau.
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bodies.36 The government employed over 180,000 civil servants, or about 6% of the
labour force in Hong Kong. Until the 1980s, the legislature was an appointed body
dominated by the civil service and business representation. The formal govern-
mental and public agencies or corporations were supported by 500-odd boards,
councils and advisory committees composed of civil servants and members of the
public appointed by the government.
It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive review of all the institutions
involved in the economic governance of Hong Kong. This section highlights the
role of some of the more important institutions and assesses the impact of Hong
Kong's political reversion on the institutional framework. Of the three major
categories of public institutions (government departments, public agencies and
advisory committees), government departments play the leading role not only in
carrying out economic policies but also in formulating policies. Unlike career civil
servants elsewhere, Hong Kong's top civil servants also have policy-making roles
as policy secretaries. Government Departments in charge of fiscal and economic
policies include: Economic Services Bureau, The Finance Bureau, Financial Ser-
vices Bureau, Trade and Industry Bureau, and Works Bureau. The Financial Branch
plays a critical role, being responsible for overall resource planning including
drawing up and applying of overall public expenditure guidelines.37
The Trade and Industries departments under the Trade and Industry Bureau are
key bodies in Hong Kong's economic governance. Proclaiming its mission to be a
driving force in world trade liberalization, the Trade Department, for example, has
36. Agriculture and Fisheries Department; Architectural Services Department; Audit Department; Auxiliary
Medical Services; Buildings Department; Census and Statistics Department; Civil Aid Services; Civil Aviation
Department; Civil Engineering Department; Civil Service Training and Development Institute; Companies Registry;
Correctional Services Department; Customs and Excise Department; Drainage Services Department; Education
Department; Electrical and Mechanical Services Department; Environmental Protection Department; Fire Services
Department; Government Flying Service; Government Laboratory; Government Land Transport Agency; Government
Property Agency; Government Supplies Department; Health Department; Highways Department; Home Affairs
Department; Hospital Services Department; Housing Authority; Housing Department; Immigration Department;
Industry Department; Information Services Department; Information Technology Services Department; Inland
Revenue Department; Intellectual Property Department; Labour Department; Lands Department; Land Registry; Legal
Department; Legal Aid Department; Management Services Agency; Marine Department; New Airport Projects
Co-ordination Office (Hong Kong Airport Core Programme); Official Receiver's Office; Official Language Agency;
Planning Department; Post Office; Printing Department; Public Records Office; Radio Television Hong Kong; Rating
and Valuation Department; Regional Services Department; Registration and Electoral Office; Royal Hong Kong Police
Force; Royal Observatory; Social Welfare Department; Student Financial Assistance Agency; Telecommunications
Authority; Office of the Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority; Territory Development Department; Trade
Department; Transport Department; Treasury; Urban Services Department; Water Supplies Department; Airport
Authority; Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority; Consumer Council; Employees Retraining Board; Equal
Opportunities Commission; Hong Kong Arts Development Council; Hong Kong Council for Academic Accreditation;
Hong Kong Council on Smoking and Health; Hong Kong Examinations Authority; Hong Kong Export Credit
Insurance Corporation; Hong Kong Industrial Estates Corporation; Hong Kong Industrial Technology Centre
Corporation; Hong Kong Monetary Authority; Hong Kong Productivity Council; Hong Kong Sports Development
Board; Hong Kong Tourist Association; Hong Kong Trade Development Council; Hospital Authority; Independent
Commission Against Corruption; Independent Police Complaints Council; Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation;
Legal Aid Services Council; Mass Transit Railway Corporation; Occupational Safety and Health Council; the
Ombudsman; Port Development Board; Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data; Office of the Public Service
Commission; Securities and Futures Commission; Standing Commission on Civil Service Salaries and Conditions
of Service; University Grants Committee; Vocational Training Council.
37. The official version of the roles of the Bureau is given in its website, Hong Kong Government Information
Centre: http://www.info.gov.hk/fb.
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not only been active in the promotion and protection of Hong Kong's economic and
trade interests, but also in ensuring compliance, and safeguarding the credibility of
Hong Kong's trade regime. The department has to make sure that Hong Kong
industrialists and traders observe the textiles control policy in accordance with the
World Trade Organization Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. It also imposes
licensing control for pharmaceutical products and medicines on health and safety
grounds and the availability of essential foodstuffs for emergency situations. For
ozone depleting substances, it also exercises licensing control over local consump-
tion of controlled substances as agreed under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, as well as having licensing control over
strategic commodities to prevent Hong Kong from being used as a conduit for the
proliferation of weapons.38 The Industry Department, responsible for facilitating
the further development of manufacturing and service industries, has become more
active in developing closer relationships between government, business, education
and training institutions, and industrial support bodies.39
In recent years the Hong Kong government's role in macro-economic manage-
ment has become far more visible. A large number of government departments or
other public corporations have been set up to regulate the economy, provide more
support to local industries and to ensure the territory's compliance to international
agreements. In 1989, for example, the government established the Securities and
Futures Commission to regulate the trading of securities, futures and leveraged
foreign exchange contracts in response to the exposure of deficiencies of regulatory
framework following the market crash of 1987.40 The market crash of 1997 also
prompted the government to conduct a comprehensive review of the financial
markets in Hong Kong. Although the report maintained that the economic system
in the territory was sound and the regulatory mechanism had worked during the
financial crisis, it also made specific recommendations to tighten the regulatory
framework further.41 Following the August intervention in 1998, the government
announced a series of further measures to 'restore market order' including a
30-point programme to 'tighten up the disciplines in the securities and futures
market'.42
Another example is the Intellectual Property Department. As intellectual property
becomes an important element in the world trade regime, the government estab-
lished the department on 2 July 1990. It is the focal point in the review and
enforcement of Hong Kong intellectual property legislation. The department also
administers the system of registration of trade marks and patents in Hong Kong.43
Of the numerous institutions established in recent years in economic governance,
38. Details of the Trade Department's work are given in the department's website, Hong Kong Government
Information Centre: http://www.info.gov/trade/department/.
39. Industry Department website, Hong Kong Government Information Centre http://www.ingo.gov.hk/id/.
40. For a brief official history of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission see the Commission's website:
http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/about/backgrnd.htm, 'Historic Background to the SFC', June 1997.
41. Report on Financial Markets Review (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
April 1998).
42. 'Measures to tighten up securities and futures markets', Daily Information Bulletin, (7 September 1998).
43. Hong Kong Monetary Authority website, Hong Kong Government Information Centre: http://info.gov.hk/
hkma/.
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however, the most important one is HKMA. Established on 1 April 1993 by
merging the Office of the Exchange Fund with the Office of the Commissioner of
Banking, the primary monetary policy objective of the HKMA is to maintain
exchange rate stability within the framework of the linked exchange rate system.
The authority also promotes 'the safety and stability of the banking system through
the regulation of banking business and the business of taking deposits, and the
supervision of authorized institutions; and to promote the efficiency, integrity and
development of the financial system, particularly payment and settlement arrange-
ments'.44 In defence of the Hong Kong currency in October 1997, the HKMA
adopted measures which led to increased interest rates in the territory. The attack
on the Hong Kong currency has prompted debates in Hong Kong about the link
system. While the majority of Hong Kong analysts and the public supported the
system, some economists have argued that the HKMA should not rely solely on
interest rate to defend the Hong Kong currency. But after the HKMA's review of
the currency defences, the government decided to continue with the existing linked
exchange rate mechanisms.45 The government, however, did an about turn in
August 1998 and adopted many of the measures recommended by the academic
community following its massive intervention in the market in 1998.
The government's efforts at building up institutional capacity in economic
governance are also reflected by the establishment of organizations such as the
Hong Kong Industrial Technology Centre Corporation, the Hong Kong Industrial
Estates Corporation, the Software Industry Information Centre and Cyberspace
Centre, together with efforts in promoting research and development as well as the
establishment of the Government Task Force on Services Promotion. The financial
sector was supported through the introduction of legislation to permit the develop-
ment of captive insurance industry and a Mortgage Corporation commenced
operation in 1997. The government formed a Business Advisory Group on 1
December 1996, and established three sub-groups in February 1997 to examine
issues such as deregulation, cost of compliance assessment and transfer of services
to the business sector. The Business and Services Promotion Unit was formed in
May 1997 to provide executive support. A one-stop Business Licence Information
Centre in the Industry Department was opened in September 1997.
The Financial Secretary's 1997-98 budget provided more resources in strength-
ening the institutional capacity of the government in support of the manufacturing,
services and financial sectors, as well as infra-structural support.46 The government
earmarked funds for Science Park Phase I, and began planning for a second
Industrial Technology Centre. They also began planning work for a fourth Indus-
trial Estate; and created funds to support applied research and development
schemes in order to support technology ventures with $250 million seed money. In
the area of services promotion, the government announced the formation of a new
Services Promotion Strategy Group. The Export Credit Insurance Corporation also
44. Ibid.
45. For a discussion of the issue see The Hong Kong Dollar Link by Joseph Yam (Chief Executive, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority), Speech at Hong Kong Trade Development Council Financial Roadshow in Tokyo, (3 March
1998).
46. Donald Tsang, The 1997-98 Budget: Continuity in a Time of Change, (12 March 1997).
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introduced a specific insurance policy for small and medium enterprises. Under the
Services Support Fund, the government committed $28 million to help 14 projects.
The Trade Development Council was to spend another $30 million in 1997-98 to
promote exports of services.
Thus the last colonial administration not only set in motion a more pro-active
approach to economic governance, but also the expansion of an institutional
framework which was more complex and wider in scope than before. Instead of
limiting the government's role, the Tung administration committed more funds to
'support the commercialization of research in information technology and other
high technology fields' and to 'finance initiatives which help sustain and improve
the competitiveness of the service sector'. The government also moved ahead with
the development of the Science Park at Pak Shek Kok, and the establishment of a
second Technology Centre as well as a fourth industrial estate in Tuen Mun, and
explored the need for the establishment of a business park.47 In 1998 the govern-
ment set up a Film Service Office to promote the local film industry, investigated
into the feasibility of setting up a Financial Services Institute, created a new
Commissioner for Tourism, and formed a new Small and Medium Enterprises
Office within the Industry Department.48
Although government departments and agencies have come under pressure to
enhance their productivity, it is clear that the Tung administration does not have
any intention of reversing the trend of increasing governmental involvement in the
economy.49 In fact, the administration has sought to build more institutional
capacity in managing economic affairs.
Political interests in flux
The political landscape of the territory has changed dramatically since the early
1980s when the British and Chinese governments attempted to find a solution for
Hong Kong's future. During the Sino-British talks the people of Hong Kong were
often relegated to bystanders, but many did make their views known and nascent
political groups were formed to champion their political demands. Political reforms
in the 1980s began at the local level with the establishment of district boards with
elected members to advise the government on matters affecting the welfare of the
district. The government subsequently not only further broadened the base of
citizen representation at the level of local and district administration, but also
introduced elected seats onto the Legislative Council as the British and Chinese
governments negotiated for Hong Kong's future in the early and mid-1980s.50
By the time Chris Patten was appointed Governor of Hong Kong in 1992, the
47. The 1997 Policy Address: Policy Programmes (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government, 1997), p. 308.
48. From Adversity to Opportunity, Address by the Chief Executive The Honourable Tung Chee Hwa at the
Legislative Council meeting on 7 October 1998 (Hong Kong: HKSAR government, 1998).
49. The Chief Executive announced in his 1998 policy speech that government departments and agencies would
have to deliver 5% productivity gain of their operating expenditure between 1998 and 2002.
50. For a detailed analysis of political developments in Hong Kong see discussions in Lo Shiu-hing, The Politics
of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan, 1997), especially chapters 2, 3 and 4.
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people of Hong Kong had already taken the first steps in directly electing their
representatives to the Legislative Council, which was moving towards a fully
elected legislature. The people of Hong Kong cast their votes for a fully elected
Legislative Council in September 1995.51 Political parties representing grass-root
and labour interests were able to exercise far more influence in the legislature. As
the political system gradually opened up, the alliance between big business and the
administration weakened, and smaller businesses and firms and labour groups have
been more active in competing for political support to advance their interests.
Moreover, the bureaucracy have come under greater public pressure to explain
government policies to the public.
The business community has regained some of its prominence as a central
political force in the SAR compared to the Patten era. Under Patten only four of
the nine non-government members of the Executive Council were businessmen,
compared to six out of nine in 1991 under Governor David Wilson and seven out
of eight in 1986 under the Governorship of Edward Youde.52 Under Tung's
leadership, businessmen and professionals have been able to dominate the Execu-
tive Council again. Among Executive Council members, only Tam Yiu-chung,
a trade unionist and member of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong, comes from a grass-roots background.53
Beijing loyalists and those from the business community were also able to
dominate the provisional legislature. While a majority of the Provisional Legisla-
tive Council members served in the 1995 Legislative Council under the former
colonial administration, political dynamics have undergone significant changes. The
Democratic Party, the largest political force of the 1995 Legislative Council, was
out of the provisional legislature. Political parties and other groups such as the
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Progressive
Alliance, and the Liberal Party, which had good relations with the leadership in
Beijing during the territory's transition, became dominant forces in the legislature.
Pro-democratic forces such as the Democratic Party, the Frontier and the Citizen
Party managed to return to the first SAR Legislative Council following the May
1998 elections, but the number of Democratic Party members in the legislature
went down from 19 to 13, and the overall political strength of the pro-democracy
forces was less than one third of the legislature (see Table 1 for a breakdown of
political party strength in Hong Kong's legislature). The dominance of pro-Beijing
forces, well-represented in the functional constituencies and Election Committee
seats, have not lost their influence in the legislature. Moreover, as the Basic Law
stipulates, Legislative Council members are divided into two voting categories—
those elected from functional constituencies and those elected from geographical
51. For discussions on the 1995 elections see Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, Louie Kin-sheun and Timothy K.Y.
Wong, eds, The 1995 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996).
52. See Norman Miners, 'Consultation with business interests: the case of Hong Kong', The Asian Journal of Public
Administration 18(2), (December 1996), p. 254.
53. Members of the SAR government's first Executive Council are: the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa; Chief
Secretary for Administration, Anson Chan; Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang; Secretary for Justice, Miss Elsie
Leung; Sze-yuen, Chung (convenor); Nellie Fong; Rosanna Wong; Henry Tang; Charles Lee; Tam Yiu-chung; Yang
Ti-Iiang; Leung Chun-ying; Anthony Leung; Raymond Ch'ien; and Chung Shui-ming.
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Table 1. Ranking of political party/group strength in Hong Kong's legislature
Party name
Democratic Party
Liberal Party
DAB/FTU
ADPL
HKPAa
LDP
NHKA
123 DA
Citizen Partyb
Frontier0
NWSCd
Independents
Total
Legislative Council
(1995-1997)
19
10
7
4
2
1
1
1
NA
NA
NA
15
60
Provisional Legislative
Council (1997-1998)
"o
10
11
4
6
3
2
0
NA
NA
NA
24
60
First SAR Legislative
Council (1998-2000)
13
9
10
0
5
NA
NA
0
1
3
1
19
60
DAB: Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong.
FTU: Federation of Trade Unions.
ADPL: Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood.
HKPA: Hong Kong Progressive Alliance.
LDF: Liberal Democratic Foundation.
NHKA: New Hong Kong Alliance.
123 DA: 123 Democratic Alliance.
NWSC: Neighbourhood and Workers' Service Centre.
a
 HKPA and the LDF merged on 26 May 1997.
b
 Citizen Party, formed in May 1997, did not take part in the Provisional Legco elections.
c
 The Frontier, formed on 26 August 1996, did not take part in the Provisional Legco elections.
d
 The NWSC candidate was also a Frontier member but decided to run under the NWSC.
Source: complied by the author based on electoral results released by the government.
constituencies. Motions, bills or amendments of government bills introduced by
individual Legislative Council members can only be passed with the support of a
majority of members from both categories. This imposes severe limitations on the
powers of the Legislative Council in making policy initiatives or challenging
government policies.54
With more pro-Beijing businessmen gaining political prominence, and as main-
land China becomes one of the leading investors in Hong Kong, a key question is:
will various mainland China-related enterprises and other business ventures funded
by mainland China-related organizations become the new princely hongs (large
British trading houses which once dominated Hong Kong)? By the mid-1990s the
number of mainland-backed enterprises registered in Hong Kong had reached 1756,
with an estimated total asset value of US$42.5 billion. The Bank of China and its
12 sister banks are now the second largest banking group in the territory after
Hongkong Bank. Since May 1994 the Bank of China has also become a Hong
Kong dollar note-issuing bank. There are 18 Chinese banks in total operating in
54. Details of the elections are well covered by the local press. See for example, South China Morning Post,
(25 and 26 May). Official election results are given in Daily Information Bulletin, (25 May 1998).
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Hong Kong.55 Mainland enterprises listed in the Hong Kong stock market and or
those seeking listing have attracted wide support in the local market. The red chips
achieved record highs in the run up to the handover. In fact, share prices for blue
chips went up whenever rumours about the injection of capital from mainland
enterprises were reported. Some observers therefore described them as pink chips.
The expansion of mainland businesses in Hong Kong and their penetration of the
economy has been extensive in the board rooms of Hong Kong's corporate world,
but also in well-established public institutions including advisory boards and
committees.
One example is the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee. The reserve from the
Fund is a key element in maintaining Hong Kong's financial stability. The reserves
from the bank of the Exchange Fund are managed by the HKMA which at the end
of 1996 reached HK$535 billion (almost US$ 69 billion), or HK$83,316 (US$
10,682) per person in the territory. As the Exchange Fund represents a very
significant store of value for the people of Hong Kong, the HKMA has to adopt a
prudent investment strategy to ensure that the investment management process
follows international practices. According to the Exchange Fund Ordinance, the
Financial Secretary exercises control of the Fund in consultation with an Exchange
Fund Advisory Committee chair by himself and with other members who are
appointed by the Governor. The Committee advises the Financial Secretary as
controller of the Exchange Fund on general policy relating to its deployment.56
While the Committee members sit in a personal capacity, they represent major
banks in the territory, including the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
the Bank of East Asia; Standard Chartered Bank; the Chase Manhattan Bank; Hang
Seng Bank; and the Bank of China. With the exception of Liang Xiaoting from the
Bank of China, all have spent most of their career in the territory.57 As mainland
enterprises become more active, a larger number of representatives from major
mainland banks and other enterprises are expected to be more closely involved with
economic governance in Hong Kong. The formation of the Hong Kong Chinese
Enterprises Association in 1991 gave such enterprises a collective and distinct
political voice. It is perhaps not surprising that more representatives from some of
the more powerful enterprises will be appointed to major advisory bodies and
become more influential.
However, the mainland Chinese enterprises are unlikely to enjoy the same degree
of privileges as those enjoyed by the British hongs in colonial days. These firms
or corporations, owned and managed by British business interests, have been on the
decline since the 1970s. The domination of British business interests was evident
in the earlier days of colonial rule. In 1965 over one third of the seats of the
Executive, Legislative and Urban Councils were occupied by British businessmen.
In 1976 all but two of the major business groups were owned and controlled by
expatriate business families. By 1986 Chinese businessmen such as Li Ka Shing
55. Economic Information on Hong Kong and China, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 5 June 1997. For
an analysis of mainland China-Hong Kong economic relations also see: Yun-Wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong
Connection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
56. Hong Kong Monetary Authority website, Hong Kong Government Information Centre.
57. Ibid.
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and Y. K. Pao had taken over a number of British firms. Expatriates also only
occupied 13% of all the council seats. The steep decline of the British businesses
and their political influence reflected not only political developments in Hong Kong
but deeper structural changes in the Hong Kong economy. A number of local
Chinese firms have become immensely successful. The structural diversity of the
Hong Kong economy which consists of international businesses, a number of large
Chinese firms, numerous small and medium size enterprises and Chinese enter-
prises which are in turn diversified in nature, means that business interests are not
always coherent. Mainland Chinese enterprises are also unlikely to occupy the
same position as the British hongs once did.58
Although pro-China and pro-business interests will be influential forces in
shaping the economic governance of the Hong Kong SAR, the diverse economic
structure and fragmentation of business and pro-China interests as well as resist-
ance within the administration should limit their influence. The introduction of
electoral politics in Hong Kong also means that labour and welfare interests cannot
be brushed off easily. While the institutional machinery which serves the new class
of business elite in the SAR has remained powerful, Hong Kong's 'democratiza-
tion' in recent years has injected new elements into Hong Kong's economic
governance and constraints on the institutional capacity of the administration.
Only a few days before the political handover, the Legislative Council passed
new labour laws on 25 June 1997 to provide workers with the right of collective
bargaining and better conditions of work. The government was opposed to the
introduction of such laws, arguing that they were not properly discussed in
the normal consultative channels such as the Labour Advisory Board. The Sec-
retary for Education and Manpower, Joseph Wong, suggested that the laws would
adversely affect industrial relations in Hong Kong with far reaching consequences.
The Liberal Party, which represents business interests, walked out of the Council
meeting in disgust when their opposition to the bills was ignored by other
legislators representing grass-roots and labour interests.59
Major chambers of commerce in Hong Kong expressed their opposition to the
new labour laws in a joint newspaper advertisement. One of Hong Kong's leading
businessman, James Tien, who became chairman of the pro-business Liberal Party
in 1997, wrote just before Hong Kong's reversion in his capacity as chairman of
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce that Hong Kong had been
polarized by labour issues and policies under the last colonial administration. Tien
expected that, 'In the SAR era, employers and employees, instead of resorting to
collective bargaining, strikes, union militancy and private members' bills will
resolve their differences through reason, dialogue and compromise, and work
towards a common goal—maintaining stability and prosperity for Hong Kong'. He
further maintained that, 'we need to ensure the executive administration is not
overwhelmed by populist politicians who entice voters with free lunches and
welfare promises. The representation in the legislature needs to be more diverse
58. Wong Siu-lun, 'Business and politics in Hong Kong during the transition', Hong Kong in Transition 1992
(Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Research Institute, 1993), pp. 489-514. See, in particular, pp. 491-500.
59. See South China Morning Post, (25 June 1997), Wen Wei Po, (24 June 1997), and Ming Pao Editorial,
(25 June 1997).
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and reflective of the wide range of views in our community'. He predicted that, '
In the SAR era, with economics taking precedence over politics, we will return to
a more orderly and productive environment which we had during the time when our
GDP growth was double what it is today'.60
When the SAR government introduced the Legislative Provisions (Suspension of
Operation) Bill in 1997 to freeze seven laws passed by the former Legislative
Council, including those related to labour matters, members of the Provisional
Legislative Council raised objections.61 The government's unprecedented move to
suspend ordinances already in operation was seen as a departure from usual
practices.62 Provisional Legislative Council supported the administration's position
on four ordinances related to labour matters with 40 votes, but not the other
ordinances. The Council also extracted a promise from the government not to
extend the freeze beyond 30 October 1997 without its approval.
There is little doubt that the business community has maintained its influence and
indeed attempted to reassert itself as the central political force under the Tung
administration. However, unlike the old colonial days, the legislature would not be
completely dominated by the business elite alone. Even pro-Beijing groups such as
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong
Federation of Trade Unions have to orient towards labour and grass-roots interests.
The labour laws passed by the Legislative Council were the result of a coalition
among groups with different positions on the Beijing government. In fact more
directly elected seats will be gradually introduced to the legislature according to the
Basic Law (half of the 60-member assembly will be returned from direct elections
by 2004). The introduction of competitive electoral politics, even in a limited form,
and a political culture of open debate and discussions, again even with constraints,
have changed the political landscape of Hong Kong.
Conclusions
The once intimate government-business alliance has become rather fragile in
post-colonial Hong Kong. The conditions for the old colonial model of economic
governance no longer exist. While the government still maintains a policy of
'minimum interference', positive non-interventionism has been continuously re-
defined under different circumstances. Economic liberalism in Hong Kong has been
eroded slowly by a deteriorating international economic environment and increased
competition from neighbouring economies long before the establishment of the
SAR. Although the administration is still committed to keeping the Hong Kong
economy free and open, it has become more assertive than before, its institutional
capacity has also become more complex and the scope of public services has been
expanded.
60. James Tien, 'Playing to our strength', South China Morning Post, (29 June 1997).
61. Protection of the Harbour Ordinance; Employment (Amendment) (No. 4) Ordinance 1997; Occupational
Deafness (Compensation) (Amendment) Ordinance 1997; Employment (Amendment) (No. 5) Ordinance 1997;
Employees' Rights to Representation, Consultation and Collective Bargaining Ordinance 1997; Trade Unions
(Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance 1997; and Hong Kong Bill of Rights (Amendment) Ordinance 1997.
62. Press release by the government, (8 July 1997).
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The political framework which has emerged in the SAR is far more dynamic
than in the old days. The dominance of the bureaucrats is being challenged by the
pro-Beijing elite in an environment marked by the growing importance of compet-
itive politics. Internationally, the globalized nature of the world economy has
reinforced the vulnerability of an open and relatively small economy like that of
Hong Kong—hence the dilemma of keeping the economic regime open and
competitive on the one hand, and maintaining economic stability in a far more
turbulent international environment. The Hong Kong economy has been badly
shaken by external forces. The Asian financial crisis, precipitated by the collapse
of Southeast Asian currencies in the second half of 1997 and subsequently leading
to a wider financial turmoil in the region, crippled most East Asian economies,
including Hong Kong. The transfer of sovereignty and domestic political changes
have also lead to the reconfiguration of economic and political interests.
While Chinese mainland enterprises are becoming more important in the SAR,
they do not seemed to have acquired special privileges. In the longer run, to what
extent influences from Beijing would eventually alter the rules of the game in Hong
Kong still remain unclear. For the time being, however, the central government, has
adopted a hands-off approach to the SAR. The more immediate challenge to the
Tung administration is how to respond to popular demand for improving the
livelihood of the people, and at the same time face the business community's
concern about Welfarism as well as their demand for greater political influences
during the current economic downturn.
Government-business dynamics in Hong Kong since the reversion have evolved
within the framework of changing domestic and international situations. On the one
hand, the Hong Kong state became more pro-active and has deepened its involve-
ment in the economy by identifying priority areas for development and
strengthening its institutional capacity. On the other hand, the emerging post-col-
onial political order in Hong Kong is also imposing new constraints on the
administration. One thing is clear though: Hong Kong has to adjust itself in
response to a changing environment. A new model of economic governance is
emerging in Hong Kong SAR—indeed it is business as usual.
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